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Abstract
Levi’s Stadium in Santa Clara, California is an example of a private financing / public
ownership arrangement. While the stadium’s construction resulted in no direct tax increases, this
ownership arrangement allows the San Francisco 49ers to avoid many types of taxes on the
income generated from Levi’s Stadium. We estimate the total tax savings to the 49ers at between
$106 and $213 million over the first 20 years of Levi’s Stadium compared with a privately
financed and owned option. We argue that tax savings inherent in private financing / public
ownership arrangements represent indirect and hidden subsidies.
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Introduction
The past 30 years have witnessed a remarkable transformation of the stadium
infrastructure among the major professional sports leagues in the United States and Canada. In
2016, 135 out of the 143 teams in the National Football League (NFL), National Basketball
Association (NBA), Major League Soccer (MLS), Major League Baseball (MLB), and National
Hockey League (NHL) will be playing in facilities constructed or significantly refurbished since
1987. The overwhelming majority of these facilities have received significant public subsidies to
cover construction costs or through one-time or on-going tax exemptions. The median public
contribution to stadium and arena construction expenses over the past 30 years is roughly 70
percent of the building cost.
In the NFL, every team plays in a stadium under 30 years old or a stadium having
undergone major updates over that time. See Table 1 for a list of current NFL stadiums, along
with their costs. One of the notable aspects of this list is the recent spate of billion dollar
stadiums starting in 2009 with a new stadium in Arlington, Texas for the Dallas Cowboys, and
continuing on with pricy new stadiums in East Rutherford, New Jersey (New York Giants and
New York Jets), Santa Clara, California (San Francisco 49ers), Minneapolis, Minnesota
(Minnesota Vikings), and Atlanta, Georgia (Atlanta Falcons). Not only are the nominal price tags
of these stadiums eye-popping, but in most cases the public contribution to the construction of
these facilities is a fraction of the amount spent on stadiums over the previous 20 years. In fact,
for the 25 NFL stadium projects between 1987 and 2008, the taxpayer picked up roughly threequarters of the total constructions costs. Since 2009, the total public contribution has been only
about one-quarter of the total construction costs.
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Furthermore, in each of the billion dollar stadiums that have recently opened or are
currently under construction, the team or the league has contributed between half and all of the
construction costs. The actual facility, however, is or will be owned by a government agency
specifically created for the stadium even though, in most cases, all of the operational and
management functions are performed by the team. This paper examines the tax benefits to an
NFL team of having a publicly owned but privately operated stadium, with a specific analysis of
Levi’s Stadium, the San Francisco 49ers stadium that opened in 2014 in Santa Clara. A careful
analysis of the tax benefits demonstrates that teams are still receiving substantial public subsidies
despite an apparent reduction in the direct subsidies for NFL stadiums. These indirect subsidies
include an exemption from property taxes and a reduction in income taxes. The analysis
indicates that the value of the indirect hidden subsidies for the Levi’s Stadium is between $106
and $213 million dollars over the first twenty years of its existence.

Santa Clara Stadium
The opening of Levi’s Stadium in August 2014 was the culmination of several attempts
to replace Candlestick Park, the home of the NFL’s San Francisco 49ers since 1971. In two
separate attempts, the 49ers planned a new stadium near their current home in Candlestick Point.
Both of these attempts would have utilized public funding from the city of San Francisco, but a
combination of outside forces and disagreements between the 49ers and the city stalled both of
these efforts. The second attempt is notable because the city hoped a new stadium would increase
their chances to win the bid to host the 2016 Summer Olympics.1 Soon after these plans
dissolved in 2006, the 49ers announced a commitment to move the team to Santa Clara, roughly

1

Matier, Phillip, and Andrew Ross, “Newsom’s Olympic Vision sees new 49ers stadium,” San Francisco
Chronicle, July 11, 2006.
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40 miles to the southeast and also the home of its headquarters and training facility. In the past,
the city of Santa Clara had tried unsuccessfully to attract two of the other Bay Area professional
teams, the San Francisco Giants and Oakland A’s.
In July 2009, 49er officials presented plans for a new stadium to the Santa Clara City
Council. These preliminary plans noted a proposed $937 million stadium operated by a
partnership between the city and the team.2 It pledged that construction would not use money
from the city’s general fund or require any new taxes, hold the 49ers responsible for any cost
overruns, and set the rent paid by the 49ers at “fair market.”3 The Santa Clara City Council voted
to put the issue to a ballot measure vote.
This initiative, known as Measure J, was passed by city voters with roughly 58 percent
support on June 8, 2010. At the time, it was believed that the public contribution would be
roughly $114 million from Redevelopment Authority funds and an increase in the local hotel tax.
It was hoped that the city might recoup a portion of these funds through their cut of stadium
revenues from any non-NFL events which are split evenly between the 49ers and the city.
In February 2011, the city of Santa Clara formed the Santa Clara Stadium Authority,
which
“…exists as a public body, separate and distinct from the City, and is established to
provide for development and operation of the proposed stadium, in order to ensure that
the stadium serves the goals of its other member--the City of Santa Clara.”4
Membership in the Santa Clara Stadium Authority is technically the city of Santa Clara, but the
governing board comprises most of the city’s most powerful politicians, including the mayor,
city manager, and the seven members of the city council.5
2

Associated Press, “Niners show Santa Clara officials plans for new $937 million stadium,” July 15, 2009.
City of Santa Clara, “Stadium Term Sheet”, http://santaclara.gov/index.aspx?page=1197, accessed March 4, 2014.
4
City of Santa Clara, “Stadium Authority”, http://santaclaraca.gov/index.aspx?page=1880, accessed March 4, 2014.
3
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Construction could not begin until financing was secured. Ultimately the Santa Clara
Stadium Authority received $950 million in loans from a combination of private banks.6 Since
the ballot measure promised that the stadium would not impact the city’s general fund, the loan
will be repaid through a variety of stadium revenues such as naming rights, lease payments from
the team, and “stadium builders licenses” (i.e., personal seat licenses (PSL)) sales. By this time,
the estimated cost of the stadium had risen to well over $1 billion, and the NFL agreed to provide
an additional $200 million in funding through its “G4” program in February 2012. The G4
program provides loans from the NFL’s general fund for stadium construction.7 With the vast
majority of its funding in place, groundbreaking for the new stadium occurred in April 2012 (See
Figure 1).
It should be noted that it is somewhat odd that a facility billed as an almost entirely
privately financed stadium, with only a $114 million public contribution, required the Santa
Clara Stadium Authority, for all intents and purposes a public agency, to borrow $950 million for
stadium construction. Similarly, if the team is responsible for the majority of the construction
costs, it seems unusual for them to then grant ownership of its fixed investment to a local
government entity. In fact, the sole purpose of this agency is to funnel revenues raised to build
the stadium through a public agency rather than a private firm. As the next section of this paper
will demonstrate, this setup has significant tax advantages to the 49ers.
By 2013, plans for other revenue sources began to surface. In May 2013, the San
Francisco-based jeans company Levi Strauss, the Santa Clara Stadium Authority, and the 49ers
announced an agreement to name the structure “Levi’s Stadium” in exchange for approximately
5

Ibid.
Rosenberg, Mike, “Levi’s Stadium is a model for privately financed venues,” San Francisco Chronicle, February
5, 2016..
7
Mintz, Howard, “NFL owners approve $200 million loan for 49ers stadium,” San Jose Mercury News, February 3,
2012.
6
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$220 million over 20 years. Seventy percent of the naming rights payments accrue to the city and
the remainder to the team.8 Levi’s Stadium has already hosted several events outside of home
49ers games. The inaugural event at the stadium was a MLS match between the San Jose
Earthquakes and the Seattle Sounders FC on August 2, 2014. In addition, Levi’s Stadium has
hosted a college football game between the University of California and the University of
Oregon in October 2014, WrestleMania 31 in March 2015, and Super Bowl L in February 2016.
The design of the stadium allows it to host a variety of events, including international soccer,
motocross, and concerts.
By mid-2013, costs had risen to $1.3 billion.9 Around this time, the Santa Clara Stadium
Authority refinanced its non-NFL loans and announced that revenues from seat licenses had
exceeded expectations.10 For these reasons, the Stadium Authority lowered rent for the 49ers
from $30 million to $24.5 million per year.11 Profits for the 49ers during the inaugural season
were projected to be $100 million, 12 but more recent estimates place yearly profits at just over
$150 million thanks to higher than expected sales.13 This is particularly large for an organization
with near zero profit margins in the previous seasons. Given these estimates of revenue sources
to build the stadium, it is now possible to estimate the tax advantages associated with essentially
privately building the stadium using a public agency as a shell corporation.

8

Rosenberg, Mike, “Levi’s Stadium: 49ers’ new Santa Clara home gets a name in $220 million deal,” San Jose
Mercury News, May 8, 2013.
9
Rosenberg, Mike, “49ers new Santa Clara stadium cost goes up again - - to $1.3 billion,” San Jose Mercury News,
June 8, 2013.
10
Rosenberg, Mike, “New San Francisco 49ers stadium’s long-term costs drop by up to $90 million,” San Jose
Mercury News, May 1, 2013.
11
Rosenberg, Mike, “49ers new Santa Clara stadium cost goes up again - - to $13. billion,” San Jose Mercury News,
June 8, 2013.
12
Kawakami, Tim, “Cash Register: The 49ers’ profit-margin in Santa Clara, starting next year will be LARGE,”
blog of San Jose Mercury News, August 30, 2013.
13
Kawakami, Tim, “The 49ers are minting money ($150M+ annual profits), it’s official now–and the Raiders are
doing OK, too,” San Jose Mercury News, September 16, 2016.
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Estimating Tax Advantages
As currently structured, the Santa Clara Stadium Authority is designed to pay for the
financing of the stadium through revenues generated by the stadium - primarily naming rights
and personal seat licenses. The team keeps the entire revenue generated by NFL events and splits
the revenue generated by non-NFL events with the city. Due to complexities in the financial
arrangements, all numbers in this section should be considered approximations. Although the
Stadium Authority borrowed a substantial amount of money to finance construction, personal
seat license revenue allowed the Stadium Authority to retire a substantial portion of its initial
debt soon after its construction. After the conclusion of the first 49er football season, personal set
license revenue was $554.6 million.14 The remaining long term debt – approximately $540
million – is split over three loans with different terms and interest rates.15 For our purposes, we
amortize the remaining long-term debt over 25 years at an interest rate of 5%, a conservative
estimate of what the stadium authority is currently paying on its loans. In addition, the 49ers are
paying rent of $24.5 million per year and the Stadium Authority’s 70% share of Levi Strauss’
20-year, $220 million stadium naming rights deal amounts to another $7.7 million per year.
These two payments put together, both of which come from private payment streams, are
sufficient to cover the debt payments. Thus, the direct subsidy from the city of Santa Clara
towards the stadium is limited to $114 million or just under 10% of the total construction cost, an
amount well below the historical average subsidy for stadium construction in the NFL, or the
other major sports leagues in the U.S. However, the indirect subsidies to the team in terms of tax
advantages due to the public ownership of the privately financed stadium are quite large. These

14

City of Santa Clara, “Santa Clara Stadium Authority Financial Statements March 31, 2016,”
http://santaclaraca.gov/government/stadium-authority/public-safety-cost-and-reimbursement-summary, accessed
November 16 2016.
15
Ibid.
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indirect subsidies include an exemption from paying property taxes and a reduction in total
income taxes. The 49ers also are exempt from paying sales, amusement or entertainment taxes,
or other surcharge obligations on revenue from its NFL events.16 As we will show, these
exemptions create extraordinary tax savings for the 49ers.
If the stadium had been privately owned and financed, the 49ers would have had to pay
state and federal corporate income tax on the sales of the personal seat licenses, as well as on the
additional 70% share of naming rights deal that currently goes to the stadium authority, (the
49ers would pay taxes on their 30% share of the naming rights in either case). The marginal state
tax rate for large corporations in California is 8.84%17 while it is 35%18 at the federal level. The
team would get to deduct the cost of the stadium using straight line depreciation over a 39-year
period19. Levi’s Stadium has a depreciable cost of $1.273 billion ($1.31 billion less $37 million
paid by the City of Santa Clara to move an electrical substation and build a parking garage)20.
The interest incurred during the construction phase was capitalized and included in the cost of
the stadium. In addition, interest expense is tax deductible for corporations. State corporate taxes
are also deductible at the federal level.
Under the current public ownership plan, the 70% of the naming rights plus the PSL sales
accrue tax free to the stadium authority. As a public entity, the stadium authority also does not
have to pay property tax on the assessed value of its holdings.21 Santa Clara charges a narrow
range of rates to commercial properties in the city at an annual rate averaging 1.14% of the

16

http://www.thenewamerican.com/economy/commentary/item/18740-taxpayers-are-on-the-hook-for-new-49ersstadium-in-santa-clara, accessed January 4, 2017.
17
2013 California Tax Rates and Exemptions,
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/2013_california_tax_rates_and_exemptions.shtml, accessed January 27, 2014.
18
Form 1120 Instructions, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120.pdf, accessed June 12, 2014.
19
Publication 946: How to Depreciate Property, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p946.pdf, accessed June 12, 2014.
20
http://www.sfgate.com/49ers/article/Levi-s-Stadium-The-1-3-billion -bet-5687409.php, accessed June 16, 2015.
21
Personal property taxes on equipment, etc. would be paid under both ownership plans and therefore not included
in the analysis.
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assessed value22. Of course, even if the stadium were privately held, the city could issue a
property tax exemption for the facility, but this exemption is automatic if the stadium is
government owned property. Property taxes paid by a corporation are also deductible at both the
state and federal level. Under the public ownership plan, the team does not have a deduction for
depreciation and interest expense from their taxable income as they would not own the stadium,
but any rent paid is fully deductible.
Table 2 shows the total taxes the team would be expected to pay through the first 20
years assuming the stadium had been privately owned and financed. For example, in year 1,
Federal taxable income is calculated by adding the net operating income, the estimate of the 49er
profits during the first year of Levi’s Stadium ($150 million)23 and the portion of the naming
rights that are currently paid to the Stadium Authority ($7.7 million). Also included in income
for year 1 is $554,600,000 in personal seat license revenue24. Deducting depreciation expense,
interest expense, California income taxes and property taxes, Federal taxable income in year 1 is
$581,734,599. Applying the marginal tax rate of 35%, federal taxes are $203,607,110 as reported
in column 7. The California income tax is calculated by deducting depreciation expense, interest
expense, and property taxes from total income at a marginal tax rate of 8.84%. The amount
reported in column 9 is the combination of federal income taxes, California income taxes and the
property taxes.
Table 3 shows the total taxes the team would be expected to pay through the first 20
years assuming the stadium is publicly owned and financed, as is the case now. Federal taxes in

22

County of Santa Clara Compliation of Tax Rates & Information, http://www.sccgov.org/sites/fin/ControllerTreasurer%20Department/Property%20Tax%20Apportionment/Documents/Tax%20Rate%20Book%2020132014.pdf, accessed February 12, 2014.
23
Kawakami, Tim, “The 49ers are minting money ($150M+ annual profits), it’s official now–and the Raiders are
doing OK, too,” San Jose Mercury News, September 16,, 2016.
24
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0247035.pdf, accessed January 19, 2017.
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year 1 for this case are computed by deducting the rent expense and the California income taxes
from the net operating income, for a total taxable income of $114,405,800. Applying the
marginal tax rate of 35% results in federal taxes of $40,042,030 as reported in column 5.
California income taxes are calculated by subtracting the rent expense from net operating income
and applying the marginal tax rate of 8.84% for a total of $11,094,200 as reported in column 4.
We assume net profits of $150 million, which is the estimate of team profits in the first year of
the stadium. The analysis is truncated at 20 years since the naming rights deal with Levi Strauss
is a 20-year contract and income becomes quite speculative. In addition, it is assumed that
corporate tax rates will be fixed over the next 20 years and that the assessed value of the stadium
will remain constant. Total taxes are discounted back to the present using a 5% discount rate, the
interest rate used to estimate what the stadium authority is currently paying on its loans.
Table 4 summarizes the present value tax savings for the public-private partnership as
currently structured in Santa Clara. We estimate that this partnership lowers the net present value
of tax revenue by over $213 million over the next 20 years in comparison to a privately-owned
facility. Even in the case where the team builds it own stadium but receives a property tax
exemption, the net present value of taxes paid still decreases by about $106 million.

Conclusions
Stadium financing in the NFL has changed dramatically. One notable movement is the
increase in cost; five recent NFL stadium constructions cost exceeded a $1 billion price tag. At
the same time, however, the percent of construction costs being covered by the public has
dropped significantly. Direct subsidies for NFL stadiums have averaged roughly 25% of
construction costs since 2008, roughly one-third the average of the previous 20 years. While this
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trend seems to favor municipalities, the recent examples of private financing / public ownership
arrangements may be hurting public budgets. In the case of Levi’s Stadium in Santa Clara, we
estimate the total tax savings to the San Francisco 49ers at between $106 and $213 million over
the next 20 years when compared with a more traditional private financing / private ownership
arrangement. We must stress that this estimation of hidden subsidies assumes the financial
conditions of the stadium and the remains the same throughout the first 20 years of Levi’s
Stadium. While income will likely fluctuate with the success of the team and popularity of the
non-NFL events held at Levi’s Stadium, this assumption nevertheless illustrates that private
financing / public ownership arrangements do not come free to the public. We therefore caution
municipalities considering public ownership of a stadium as tax revenue losses may be
substantial.
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Table 1: NFL Stadiums Construction and Upgrade Costs
Team
Atlanta
Minnesota
San Francisco
New Orleans
Giants/Jets
Kansas City
Dallas
Indianapolis
Arizona
Philadelphia
Green Bay
Chicago
New England
Houston
Detroit
Seattle
Pittsburgh
Denver
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Tennessee
Buffalo
Baltimore
Tampa Bay
San Diego
Washington
Oakland
Carolina
Jacksonville
St. Louis
Atlanta
Miami

Stadium
Mercedes-Benz Stadium
U.S. Bank Stadium
Levi’s Stadium
Superdome (repair and rehab)
New Meadowlands Stadium
Arrowhead Stadium (rehab)
Cowboys Stadium
Lukas Oil Stadium
University of Phoenix Stadium
Lincoln Financial Field
Lambeau Field
Soldier Field
Gillette Stadium
Reliant Stadium
Ford Field
Qwest Field
Heinz Field
Invesco Field
Paul Brown Stadium
Browns Stadium
LP Field
Ralph Wilson Stadium (rehab)
M&T Bank Stadium
Raymond James Stadium
Qualcomm Stadium
FedEx Field
Oakland Coliseum (rehab)
Bank of America Stadium
Everbank Field
Edward Jones Dome
Georgia Dome
Sun Life Stadium
Total: 1987-2008 – 25 projects
Total: 2009-2017 – 7 projects

Built
2017
2016
2014
2011
2010
2010
2009
2008
2006
2003
2003
2003
2002
2002
2002
2002
2001
2001
2000
1999
1999
1999
1998
1998
1997
1997
1996
1996
1995
1995
1992
1987

Reprinted and updated from Baade and Matheson (2013)
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Cost
(100,000s)
$1,500
$1,061
1,300
505
1,600
375
1,150
720
371
285
295
600
325
300
300
300
230
365
400
283
290
63
220
169
78
250
200
248
121
280
214
115
$7,022
$7,491

Public
Cost
$200
$498
$114
490
250
325
620
267
228
251
450
33
225
219
201
150
274
400
255
220
63
176
169
78
70
200
52
121
280
214
11
$5,227
$1,877

Public
Percent
13%
47%
9%
97%
0%
67%
28%
86%
72%
80%
85%
75%
10%
75%
73%
67%
65%
75%
100%
90%
76%
100%
80%
100%
100%
28%
100%
21%
100%
100%
100%
10%
74%
25%

Table 2: Estimated total tax payments for the 49ers if the stadium was under private
ownership
1
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

2
Net operating
income25
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000
157,700,000

3

4

5

Depreciation

PSLs

Interest

554,600,000

(27,000,000)
(26,434,284)
(25,840,281)
(25,216,579)
(24,561,692)
(23,874,060)
(23,152,047)
(22,393,933)
(21,597,913)
(20,762,092)
(19,884,481)
(18,962,988)
(17,995,421)
(16,979,476)
(15,912,734)
(14,792,654)
(13,616,570)
(12,381,682)
(11,085,050)
(9,723,586)
TOTAL:

(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)
(32,641,026)

TOTAL w/o
property taxes

25

Includes $150 million in annual income and an additional $7.7 million in naming rights (which are not shared in
the private ownership scenario).
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Table 2: Estimated total tax payments for the 49ers if the stadium was under private
ownership (continued)

1

6

7

8

9

10

Year

CA taxes

Federal
taxes

Property tax

Total

Discounted
Total

274,531,485
48,784,675
49,026,708
49,280,841
49,547,682
49,827,864
50,122,056
50,430,957
50,755,303
51,095,867
51,453,458
51,828,929
52,223,174
52,637,131
53,071,786
53,528,174
54,007,381
54,510,548
55,038,874
55,593,616
1,257,296,510

261,458,557
44,249,139
42,351,113
40,543,470
38,821,905
37,182,319
35,620,809
34,133,657
32,717,321
31,368,430
30,083,771
28,860,287
27,695,064
26,585,328
25,528,437
24,521,873
23,563,241
22,650,259
21,780,751
20,952,649
850,668,382

1,085,315,331

743,505,100

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
TOTAL:
TOTAL w/o
property:

56,412,175
7,435,544
7,488,054
7,543,189
7,601,081
7,661,868
7,725,694
7,792,711
7,863,079
7,936,966
8,014,547
8,096,007
8,181,540
8,271,349
8,365,649
8,464,664
8,568,630
8,677,794
8,792,416
8,912,770
209,805,728

203,607,110
26,836,931
27,026,454
27,225,452
27,434,400
27,653,796
27,884,162
28,126,046
28,380,024
28,646,701
28,926,711
29,220,723
29,529,435
29,853,582
30,193,937
30,551,310
30,926,551
31,320,554
31,734,258
32,168,646
757,246,782

235,463,298

849,852,033

15

14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
14,512,200
290,244,000

Table 3: Estimated total tax payments for the 49ers under public ownership
1
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

2
Net
operating
income
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000
150,000,000

3

4

5

6

7

8

Rent

CA taxes

Federal
taxes

Property
tax

Total

Discounted
Total

(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)
(24,500,000)

11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200
11,094,200

40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030
40,042,030

-

TOTAL: 221,884,000 800,840,600
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51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230
51,136,230

48,701,171
46,382,068
44,173,398
42,069,903
40,066,574
38,158,642
36,341,564
34,611,013
32,962,870
31,393,209
29,898,295
28,474,566
27,118,635
25,827,271
24,597,401
23,426,096
22,310,568
21,248,160
20,236,343
19,272,707
- 1,022,724,600 637,270,454

Table 4: Tax savings
Taxes paid (discounted to NPV)
Private
Public
Savings
ownership
Ownership
Total taxes

850,668,382

637,270,454

213,397,928

Total taxes excluding
property taxes

743,505,100

637,270,454

106,234,646

17

